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NORMAN N. BOWSUER
ARKET interest rates have moved over a wide
range since mid-1979. In the last half of 1979 and in
the first three months of 1980, interest rates rose to
unprecedented levels. Rates on highest grade corpo-
rate bonds, for example, increased from 9.3 percent
in June 1979 to 13 percent in March 1980. Over the
same period, yields on 4-month prime commercial
paper jumped from 97 percent to 16.8 percent, while
the prime rate on business loans at large banks rose
from 11.5 percent in mid-1979 to 20 percent in early
April 1980.
Because credit and interest rates play a crucial role
in our economic system, the substantial rise in interest
rates had wide implications. Sales of residential hous-
ing, which are particularly sensitive to interest rate
movements due to the existence of usury rate ceilings
in many states, were sharply curtailed. For those busi-
ness activities that maintained operations, costs rose,
in some cases substantially. In fact, some analysts
believe that higher interest rates were a major cause
of recession.1 On the other hand, savers received rec-
ord high returns on funds lent.
1”A Carter Recession: How Soon, How Deep?” U.S. News and
World Report (March 31, 1980), pp. 23-29; “The Credit Vise
Tightens,” Time (April 14, 1980), pp. 78-79; and “Fligh In-
terest Rates Start to Hit Florne,” U.S. News and World Report
(March 24, 1980), pp. 23-24.
A marked reversal has occurredin the financialmar-
kets since early April 1980. Highest grade corporate
bond yields decreased from 13 percent in March to
12 percent in September, and yields on commercial
paper fell from 16.8 percent to 10.9 percent. Large
banks lowered the rate charged on loans to prime
business customers from 20 percent in early April to
13 percent in late September.
Since the decline in interest rates occurred at a
time when the country was facing two serious domes-
tic economic problems — continued rapid inflation
and rising unemployment — there were disparate
opinions about its desirability. Some argued that the
lower interest rates would stimulate business and
consumer spending, while others contended that the
campaign to resist inflation and to defend the value
of the dollar internationally was being abandoned too
soon.2
This article attempts to place the recent fluctuations
in interest rate levels into perspective by discussing
both the function of interest rates and the economic
significance of their levels. In addition, it reviews re-
cent developments that impinge on interest rates.
2
See “Inflation-Fighting Must Be No. 1 Priority Despite Deep-
ening Slump, Miller Insists,” Wall Street Journal, June 5, 1980,
p. 8.
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Figure I
Intere
Note: The demand (DI far loon funds shows the amount of
loans demanded at alternative potential interest rates.
The supply (5) of loan funds shows the amount of loans
supplied at various rates of interest In equilibrium, as
illustrated in the figure, the amount of loans will be hO)
and the interest rote will be (i
0
)
Interest Rates — Real and Nominal
The rate of interest, which represents the price paid
for the use of credit, reflects the interaction between
the supply of credit and the demand for credit (figure
1).~The supply of credit arises from the willingness
of income-earners to save, that is, to postpone con-
sumption in the immediate period. The demand for
credit arises from private business firms’ investment
demand (reflecting the marginal productivity of real
capital goods), consumers’ desire to borrow for con-
sumption purposes, and government borrowing to fi-
nance deficits.
Hundreds of different interest rates are quoted
simultaneously in financial markets, These nominal
(or market) interest rates, although different from
one another, consist of the same three components:
the “real” rate of interest, the expected rate of infla-
tion, and a composite of the additional factors which
differentiate one yield from another.
The real rate of interest is determined by the mar-
ginal productivity of capital in a “riskless” economic
3
For a more extended discussion of interest rates, see Armen A.
Alchian and William R. Allen, University Economics (Bel-
mont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1972)
pp. 426-438.
environment. It is the rate of interest that would be
observed if inflation was expected to be zero and if
there were no special differences (risk, tax advantages,
etc.,) among various credit transactions. During the
last century, the real rate of interest has generally
moved within a rather limited range.
Special terms and conditions accompanying the ex-
tension of credit will produce differences among
nominal interest rates. Differences in rates due to
this source reflect variations in financial risk, length
of loans, locality, costs of servicing, tax status, and a
variety of other factors.
Because of inflation and inflationary expectations,
the market rate of interest can differ considerably
from the real rate.4 This differential exists because
lenders seek to protect the purchasing power of funds
lent, and borrowers are willing to pay a higher rate
if they expect inflation to enable them to repay the
~oans loan with cheaper dollars.
For example, if borrowers and lenders anticipate a
9 percent inflation per year over the period of the
loan, they will incorporate this expectation in the
nominal rate of interest for the loan. Thus, if the real
interest rate is 3 percent, loans will be extended at
an annual nominal rate of 12 percent; that is, the 9
percent anticipated inflation will be added to the 3
percent real return.
Studies suggest that market participants tend to
extrapolate past experience to estimate future rates of
inflation. Although they place primary emphasis on
the most recent past, they will reach back several
years for evidence.5 Regardless of past experience,
howevei-, a substantial change in monetary or fiscal
policy will alter expectations of future inflation.8
Charts 1 and 2 illustrate the relationship between
prices and market interest rates for the periods 1972-
1980 and 1960-1980, respectively.
Most of the increase in market interest rates since
the mid-1960s resulted from rising inflationary expec-
tations. From 1959 to 1965, annual inflation, as meas-
ured by the GNP price deflator, averaged 1.5 percent.
~David H. Resler, “The Formation of Inflationary Expectations,”
this Review (April 1980), pp. 2-12. Also, see “Inflation’s Im-
pact on Borrowers and Lenders,” U.S. News and World Re-
port (March 10, 1980), p.
28
.
r~5eeIrving Fischer, The Theory of Interest (New York: Mac-
millan, 1930); and William P. Yohe and Denis S. Karnosky,
“Interest Rates and Price Level Changes 1952-69,” this Review
(December 1969), pp. 18-36.
°Charles Pigott, “Expectations, Money, and Forecasting of In-
flation,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Review (Spring 1980), pp. 30-49.
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If expectations of inflation were based closely on pre-
vious actual rates, the expected rate of inflation in
the mid-1960s was approximately 1.5 percent. In con-
trast, from 1973 to early 1980, the GNP price deflator
rose at nearly an 8 percent rate, and, in view of the
13 percent rates of increase in both consumer and pro-
ducer prices in the 18 months ending March 1980,
long-run inflationary expectations were probably in
the 9 to 10 percent range in early 1980. The accelera-
tion of price increases in late 1979 and early 1.980 led
to even higher short-run inflationary expectations at
the end of March 1980.
Functions of Interest Rates
Interest rates serve a number of significant func-
tions. First, they provide investors with a guide for
allocating funds among investment opportunities. As
funds are directed into projects that have higher ex-
pected rates of return (risk and other factors taken
into account), the funds are optimally allocated from
the viewpoint of both consumer and investor, since
highest returns prevail where effective consumer de-
mand is strongest. Unless an investment opportunity
promises a return high enough to pay the market
rate of interest, it does not justify the required capital
outlay. The money market, by channeling funds into
projects that have an expected return in excess of the
interest rate, provides a valuable service to investors,
borrowers, and society as a whole.
The interest rate also provides a measure of the
relative advantage of current consumption compared
to saving. By adjusting the available market rate for
expected inflation and taxes, an individual can deter-
mine the real amount of additional future consump-
tion that can be obtained by postponing current
consumption.
Similarly, interest rates help businessmen decide
among alternative production methods. Suppose a
product can be made either solely with labor or with
a combination of labor and machinery. By calculating
the capital cost of the machine (the interest rate
times the dollar amount invested in the machine),
the expected labor-plus-capital cost can be compared
with the labor-alone cost to determine the less ex-
pensive means of production.
Finally, interest rates that are free of legal restric-
tions can respond to changing demand/supply situa-
tions and, thus, contribute to economic resiliency and
high employment. If, for example, a government
Per,,’,
I’
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spending program is trimmed, the initial result will be
unemployment and idle factories. Everything else be-
ing equal, however, reduced government spending
will eventually lead to less government borrowing and
lower nominal interest rates. At these lower rates, more
funds will be demanded by the private sector, thus
generating increased private sector jobs.
Major Factors Influencing Interest Rates
As pointed out above, interest rates are determined
by the demand for and supply of credit, both of
which are affected by specific factors. As these factors
change, interest rates change accordingly. The more
important factors include saving, business and con-
sumer investment, monetary actions, government defi-
cits or surpluses, and income tax rates.
Saving is the source of credit and, consequently,
the amount of savings is one of the prime determi-
nants of the level of real interest rates. As saving in-
creases, downward pressure is exerted on interest
rates. Conversely, as individuals and businesses save
less, or actually dissave, upward pressure is exerted
on interest rates,
Financing business inventories and capital invest-
ment constitutes a major credit demand and, because
this demand is quite variable, it contributes materially
to changes in interest rates. When economic activity
is expanding and the outlook appears favorable, busi-
nesses aggressively seek more funds to finance addi-
tional production, plants, and equipment. On the
other hand, when sales are sluggish and the future
seems grim, investment plans are sharply curtailed
and the demand for credit falls.
Similarly, consumers demand a substantial amount
of credit to finance homes, automobiles, and other
durable goods as well as to increase current consump-
tion. This demand for credit also fluctuates widely as
business conditions and the economic outlook change
and, therefore, contributes significantly to interest
rate movements.
Governments can either supply credit by running
surpluses or demand credit to finance operating defi-
cits. Since federal government expenditures have ex-
ceeded receipts in every fiscal year since 1969, the
government has become a large demander of credit,
contributing to upward pressure on interest rates. In
contrast, the federal government operated at a surplus
during the mid-1920s and, despite expanding business
investment in that period, interest rates drifted lower
on balance.
Percent 12
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Expansions or contractions in the stock of money,
for example, can temporarily influence real interest
rates and permanently affect nominal market rates.
If the Federal Reserve System expands the supply of
money and bank credit faster than borrowers and
lenders anticipate, the additional loan funds tempo-
rarily drive both market and real interest rates below
what they otherwise would have been. If rapid mone-
tary expansion continues, it will eventually be en-
tirely reflected in a higher rate of inflation and a
higher level of nominal interest rates.
People make economic decisions by taking into ac-
count all available information that has a significant
bearing on the future consequences of their decisions.
Hence, in recent years, it is likely that investors and
savers began anticipating the longer-run impacts of
monetary actions on interest rates sooner than they
did in previous periods of marked and sustained
change in the growth of monetary aggregates.7
Income tax considerations also influence market in-
terest rates.5 Since borrowers are allowed to deduct
interest payments in computing taxable income, the
more relevant after-tax cost of funds is less than the
stated contract rate. Lenders must include interest
received as taxable income, making their after-taxre-
turn less than the contract rate. Therefore, income tax
causes market rates to be higher than they would be
otherwise. As market interest rates have increased in
recent years along with rising inflationary expecta-
tions, the absolute impact of taxes has also risen
greatly. An example will help clarify this fact.
Assume that federal and state income taxes have
placed both the borrower and the lender in the 50
percent marginal bracket. If, as in the early 1960s,
market rates were 5 percent, income taxes reduced
the return by 2.5 percentage points, leaving a 2.5
percent after-tax interest rate. More recently, as mar-
ket rates fluctuated around 14 percent, income taxes
reduced the return to 7 percent, leaving a7per-
cent after-tax yield.
In the mid-1960s, the after-tax real interest rate was
about 1 percent (based on a market rate of 5 percent,
less assumed inflationary expectations of 1½ percent
7
See “Rational Expectations — Fresh Ideas That Challenge
Some Established views of Policy Making,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis Annual Report 1977, pp. 1-13; and
Thomas 1~Sargent, “A Classical Macroeconomic Model for
the United States,” Journal of Political Economy (April 1976),
pp. 207-37.
8John A. Tatom and James E. Turley, “Inflation and Taxes:
Disincentives for Capital Formation,’ this Review (January
1978), pp. 2-8.
and a 2½ percentage point tax liability). Despite the
sharp rise in market rates to 14 percent in early 1980,
the after-tax real interest rate was lower than the mid-
1960 rate and even negative. Assuming inflationary
expectations of 9 percent per year and a tax bite
of 7 percentage points, the 14 percent market in-
terest rate implies a negative 2 percent after-tax
real return.0 As the demand to borrow increases and
the supply of credit falls, interest rates tend to surge
upward until the expected real rate is positive.
Analysis of Interest Rate Rise —
Late 1979, Early 1980
Market interest rates, although already high relative
to most previous periods in this century, rose sharply
from mid-1979 to early April 1980. For example, three-
month treasury bill yields averaged 5 percent in
1976, 5.3 percent in 1977, and 7.2 percent in 1978. By
June 1979, the yield was 9.1 percent but, by early
April 1980, it had jumped to 14.8 percent. Virtually
all other interest rates also recorded sharp increases
in the late 1979-early 1980 period, with the increase
being more pronounced for shorter-term than for
longer-term maturities. Many forces combined to drive
up yields.
Although personal income continued to rise in late
1979 and early 1980, personal saving declined substan-
tially in that period, placing strong upward pressure
on rates. In the first six months of 1979, personal sav-
ing grew at an $83 billion annual rate; in the last six
months of 1979, it declined to a $65 billion rate; and
in the first quarter of 1980, it again decreased to a $64
billion rate. This decline in personal saving occurred
for a number of reasons. Tax burdens rose more
sharply than income, and inflation rapidly increased
the cost of most consumer goods. With expectations
of future prices being revised upward, the incentive
to consume immediately was strengthened.
In this same period, investment in business plants,
equipment, and inventories and in residential struc-
tures increased slightly on balance, creating an addi-
tional small upward pressure on rates. In the aggre-
gate, gross private domestic investment inched up
from a $385 billion annual rate in the first half of
1979 to a $390 billion rate in the last half, and then
drifted to a $388 billion rate in the first quarter of
1980. Fixed business investment rose, but this was
9
Tom Herman, “Even Today’s Steep Interest Rates Appear
Low if Taxes and Inflation Are Taken Into Account,” Wall
Street Journal, April 3, 1980, p. 40.
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largely offset by cutbacks in housing and in inventory
growth.
Both saving and investment decisions were heavily
influenced by accelerated inflation and inflationary
expectations. Consumer prices, for example, rose at
an average 4.3 percent annual rate from 1960 to 1977,
7.7 percent in 1978, 11.3 percent in 1979, and 18.1 per-
cent in the first quarter of 1980. The rates of increase
for producer prices were 3.9 percent, 7.8 percent, 109
percent, and 19.3 percent, respectively.
The marked increase in inflation during 1979 re-
flected both monetary and nonmonetary factors. From
the third quarter of 1976 to the third quarter of 1979,
the money stock rose at an average 8.3 percent annual
rate compared with a 5 percent rate in the previous
three years. This acceleration in monetary expansion
caused an increase in the trend rate of inflation. More-
over, strong forces pushed the current measured rate
of inflation considerably above the trend rate during
1979 and early 1980. Chief among these forces was a
substantial increase in the price of oil by OPEC,
which caused a major rise in the cost of energy and,
in turn, placed large cost-push pressures on many
other prices.
Federal government deficits increased in late 1979
and early 1980, placing further upward pressure on
rates. Deficits, as recorded in the national income ac-
counts budget, rose from an annual rate of $9.4 bil-
lion in the first half of 1979 to $12.7 billion in the
second half and to $22.9 billion in the first quarter
of 1980.
In early October 1979, the Federal Reserve an-
nounced that it would provide only enough money to
accommodate production at a gradually reduced rate
of inflation. The uncertainty about how this new
monetary policy would be implemented contributed
to higher market interest rates for a time. Previously,
from the third quarter of 1976 to the third quarter of
1979, money (M1B) had risen at an 8.3 percent an-
nual rate. Then, from the third quarter of 1979 to
the first quarter of 1980, money growth slowed to a
more moderate 5.6 percent pace. In March and April
1980, money actually contracted. The short-run impact
of the reduced money growth followed by the actual
decline in money was a reduced supply of credit,
which placed additional strong upward pressure on
interest rates.
Analysis of Interest Rate Decline —
After Early April 1980
The financial “crunch” ended in early April 1980.
Interest rates, which had been rising sharply, sud-
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denly began falling. The three-month Treasury bill
yield, which was 14.8 percent in early April, averaged
10,3 percent in September. Other rates followed a
similar course and, again, securities with the shortest
maturities showed the widest movement.
One of the chief underlying factors responsible for
this reversal was the lagged effects of the new mone-
tary policy that was announced in early October 1979.
This policy caused money to expand at a slower rate
and, initially, placed upward pressure on rates because
credit growth slowed. However, the secondary and
more powerful effects of this action offset its initial
impact after a few months.
One delayed result of supplying money to the mar-
ket at a gradually slower rate was a dampening of
economic activity. With less money being supplied,
relative to the demand to hold money, spending grad-
ually moderated. Nevertheless, credit demand con-
tinued strong for a lime because consumers and busi-
nesses were uncertain about how long the pause in
spending would continue and how long the Federal
Reserve would continue to restrain money growth. As
sales, production, and employment began falling, de-
mand for business and consumer credit sharply
declmed
Another result of the new monetary policy was its
delayed effect on inflationary expectations. Since the
rate of inflation is largely determined by the average
rate of growth of money over the previous five years,
the first few months of a new rate of money expan-
sion has little effect on the five-year average growth
trend and, hence, little effect on actual inflation. More-
over, since in the current situation there was uncer-
tainty as to how long the Federal Reserve would
maintain the more moderate money growth in view
of the rapidly rising interest rates and the expansion-
ary federal budget announced in January 1980, there
was little or no downward revision of future infla-
tionary expectations.’°The February to April 1980
money contraction, however, changed the situation
dramatically. Since market participants began to be-
lieve that significant steps were being taken to reduce
inflation (evidenced by the continued restraint on
money growth despite the business downturn and ex-
tremely high interest rates), future inflationary expec-
tations diminished.
In mid-March, the government imposed a number
of credit controls to restrain credit demand. Since
they applied to many new areas (e.g., credit cards
~°TJzeKiplinger Washington Letter, February 1, 1980.
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and money market funds), they were poorly under-
stood. In addition, they were untimely because they
were imposed just after the economy began an eco-
nomic downturn. These controls, combined with other
developments, caused consumers to reduce credit de-
mands further which, in turn, contributed to the fall
of interest rates after early April 1980.
With inflation still intensifying and interest rates
rising in the first quarter of 1980, the Administration
and many members of Congress felt that it was man-
datory that the government follow a less expansive
fiscal policy and, consequently, efforts were made to
present a “balanced” budget. Although most analysts
still felt that expenditures would continue to exceed
receipts in fiscal 1980 and 1981, the concern of public
officials and their announced intentions to trim out-
lays contributed to a reduction in inflationary expec-
tations and in interest rates.1’
Interest Rates as a Mea&urement of
Monetary Action
Market interest rate levels and movements have
been used as guides to monetary actions, particularly
by financial commentators and participants in money
and capital markets.’2 High and rising market interest
rates generally reflect monetary restriction, whereas
low and declining rates indicate monetary ease. How-
ever, market interest rates may be rising while the real
rates are falling, and it is the real rates that are im-
portant in terms of economic activity. Expansions or
contractions of money and credit can force the real
interest rate, as well as the market rate, to rise and
fall, at least temporarily. Such changes in interest rates
influence the cost of investing and, hence, the course
of economic activity.
Notwithstanding, it is virtually impossible to iso-
late and interpret the effects of monetary actions on
market interest rates. Not only are investment deei-
“The Kiplinger Washington Letter, March 21, 1980.
12At times, the Federal Reserve System has also nsed interest
rates as a measure of monetary action. For example the 66th
Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System states that, “Monetary policy in 1979 sought to
curb inflationary pressures Eariy in the year, when
incoming economic data provided some indications of soften-
ing in economic activity, the Federal Reserve avoided meas-
nres that would have led to a marked rise in interest rates or
would have severely reduced the availability of credit. But
expenditures for goods and services strengthened as the year
progressed, in part because of heightened inflationary expec-
tations. Consequently, the System adopted a progressively
less accommodative stance, allowing the federal funds rate
to rise and increasing the discount rate in several steps.”
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 66th An-
nual Report, 1979, p. 14.
sions and saving/consumption choices (among other
factors that influence interest rates) in constant flux,
but monetary actions themselves have an ambiguous
impact on rates due to the various lagging effects of
these actions.”
If the stock of money is expanded unexpectedly, for
example, the supply of available funds is aug-
mented, real and nominal interest rates are initially
depressed, and the economy is thereby stimulated. If
the new course of rapid monetary expansion is con-
tinued for approximately a year, further stimulative
effects on total demand will occur. At the same time,
however, inflation and interest rates will also begin
to move upward. If the same rate of money injection
is followed for approximately five years, the effects of
this expansive monetary action will be fully reflected
throughout the economy. Interest rates will have
reached a level which exactly reflects the real rate
plus the long-mn expected rate of inflation, Continu-
ation of the faster monetary growth would have no
further effects on real economic activity or the rate of
increase of the price level.
Since, at any one time, market interest rates reflect
the monetary actions taken over various past periods,
they have been a less reliable guide to monetary ac-
tions than rates of growth of the monetary aggre-
gates.14 More often than not over the past 60 years,
when monetary expansion has been relatively rapid
long enough to stimulate economic activity, interest
rates have risen rather than declined. The chief reason
is that inflation and inflationary expectations also in-
crease when monetary expansion is substantial enough
to drive the economy at a quicker pace. The greater
activity and the revised inflation outlook raise the
demand for credit even faster than the monetary ex-
pansion increases the supply. Similarly, when mone-
tary contraction is continued for more than a few
months, interest rates usually fall — not rise — since
the monetary contraction eventually causes an even
larger decline in credit demand by depressing total
nominal demand for goods and services.
From this analysis, it can be concluded that from
the third quarter of 1976 to the third quarter of 1979
monetary actions were expansive because money was
increasing at a relatively rapid rate. During this pe-
‘~MichaelJ. Hamburger, “The Lag in the Effect of Monetary
Policy: A Survey of Recent Literature,” Monetary Aggre-
gates and Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (October 1974), pp. 104-113.
“William Poole, “Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instru-
ments in a Simple Stochastic Macro Model,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics (May 1970), pp. 197-216.
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nod, business activity increased and inflation inten-
sified in response to the monetary stimulus. The higher
interest rates reflected the greater economic activity
and rising inflationary expectations that the monetary
expansion fostered.
From the third quarter of 1979 to February 1980,
monetary actions, as measured by money growth,
gradually became less expansive. Since interest rates
rose in this period, the two measures of policy tempo-
rarily gave similar signals of restraint as they fre-
quently do around cyclical turning points in business
activity.
From February to June 1980, money contracted —
an indication that monetary actions were extremely
restrictive. Until early April, interest rates continued
to increase but then fell sharply, indicating to some
people that a shift toward monetary ease had oc-
curred. Business activity, however, declined sharply
and inflation slowed after the first quarter of 1980.
This decline in business activity and some downward
revision in inflationary expectations were largely re-
sponsible for the fall in market interest rates.
Conclusions
Market interest rates have been moving gradually
upward since 1976. One principal cause of the rise in
rates over the longer period was an upward revision
in inflationary expectations caused both by monetary
developments and by an increase in oil prices by the
international cartel. In addition, income tax implica-
tions for both borrower and lender and the continu-
ously heavy borrowing by the government to finance
operating deficits contributed to higher yields.
From mid-1979 to the end of March 1980, interest
rates surged to unprecedentedly high levels. The main
reasons for this rise were the slowing of money growth
by the Fed, the acceleration in private borrowing
(perhaps in anticipation of credit control restrictions),
and the increase in government borrowing.
From September 1979 to June 1980, money (M1B)
expanded at an average 3 percent annual rate, down
from the rapid 8 percent average of the previous
three years. Such a marked and sustained slowing in
monetary growth temporarily placed strong upward
pressure on interest rates. As the effects of this slower
money growth were reflected in reduced spending and
as the public gained confidence that a slower growth
path for money might be continued, inflation and in-
flationary expectations began to recede. These devel-
opments, combined with the imposition of the credit
restraints, caused market rates to fall abruptly after
early April 1980.
A marked shift in monetary policy toward restraint,
such as the one that occurred from September 1979
to June 1980, has mixed implications for the economy
and future interest rates. On the one hand, the ex-
pected rate of inflation is reduced, at least temporarily.
In addition, economic activity is depressed much more
drastically during the transition to more stable prices
than it would be if money growth were slowed grad-
ually. This dramatic decline in economic activity
pushes down interest rates. On the other hand, the
lower sales, production, and employment during the
adjustment period increase the chances that high
monetary growth may be resumed and inflation may
accelerate in the future. This would lead to an in-
crease in interest rates.
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